In this paper, we present the notion and construction of threshold ring signature without random oracles. This is the first scheme in the literature that is proven secure in the standard model. Our scheme extends the Shacham-Waters signature from PKC 2007 in a non-trivial way. We note that our technique is specifically designed to achieve a threshold ring signature in the standard model. Interestingly, we can still maintain the signature size to be the same as the Shacham-Waters signature, while only a tiny computation cost is added.
INTRODUCTION
Ring Signature. A ring signature scheme (such as [24, 1, 32, 6, 30, 19, 16] ) allows members of a group to sign messages on behalf of the group without the need to reveal their identities, i.e., providing signer anonymity. Additionally, it is not possible to decide whether two signatures have been issued by the same group member. Different from a group signature scheme (such as [13, 9, 3] ), the group formation is spontaneous and there exists no group manager to revoke Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. ASIACCS '11, March 22-24, 2011 the identity of the signer. That is, under the assumption that each user is already associated with a public key of some standard signature scheme, a user can form a group by simply collecting the public keys of all the group members including his own. These diversion group members can be totally unaware of being conscripted into the group.
Ring signature schemes could be used for whistle blowing [24] , anonymous membership authentication for ad hoc groups [8] and many other applications which do not want complicated group formation stage but require signer anonymity. For example, in the whistle blowing scenario, a whistleblower gives out a secret as well as a ring signature of the secret to the public. From the signature, the public can be sure that the secret is indeed provided by a group member while they will not be able to figure out who the whistleblower is. At the same time, the whistleblower does not need any collaboration of other users who have been conscripted by him into the group of members associated with the ring signature. Hence, the anonymity of the whistleblower is ensured and the public is also certain that the secret is indeed leaked by one of the group members associated with the ring signature.
Ring signature scheme can be used to derive other primitives as well. It had been utilized to construct non-interactive deniable ring authentication [27] , perfect concurrent signature [28] and multi-designated verifiers signature [21] .
Many reductionist security proofs used the random oracle model [4] . Several papers proved that some popular cryptosystems previously proved secure in the random oracle are actually provably insecure when the random oracle is instantiated by any real-world hashing functions [10, 2] . Thus, it is natural to design a practical ring signature scheme provably secure without requiring random oracles.
Subsequently, there are some ring signature schemes that do not rely on random oracles exist in the literature. Xu et al. [31] described a ring signature scheme in the standard model. But the proof is not rigorous and is apparently flawed [5] . Chow et al. [15] gave a ring signature scheme with proof in the standard model, though it is based on a strong new assumption. Bender et al. [5] presented a ring signature secure in the standard model assuming trapdoor permutations exists. Their scheme uses generic ZAPs for NP as a building block, which may not be practical. Shacham and Waters [26] proposed an efficient ring signature scheme without using random oracles, based on standard assumption. They rely on composite order pairing that results for a trusted setup procedure. Very recently, Schäge and Schwenk [25] gave another ring signature scheme in the standard model using basic assumption. In contrast to the previous construction, they used prime order pairing instead. However, their security model does not allow the adversary to query any private key.
All the above mentioned ring signature schemes only allow one single signer, which is also known as 1-out-of-n ring signature scheme [1] .
Threshold Ring Signature. A (d, n)-threshold ring signature has the similar notion to the (1-out-of-n) ring signature. First, a (d, n)-threshold ring signature scheme requires at least t signers to work jointly for generating a signature. Second, the anonymity of signers is preserved both inside and outside the signing group. Third, those t participating signers can choose any set of n entities including themselves without getting any consent from those diversion group members. The first threshold ring signature was proposed by Bresson et al. [8] in 2002 which is followed by Wong et al. [30] in 2003. Both of them extend the 1-out-of-n ring signature from [24] in a different way. However, the idea of proving "Knowing d solutions out of n problem instance" [17] was proposed in the early 90s. Liu et al. [22] changed the idea into threshold ring signature for separate key types. Subsequently, different types of setting or construction such as ID-based [14] , certificateless-based [12] , code-based [23, 18] and lattice-based [11] have also been proposed. However, all previous threshold ring signature schemes in the literature (regardless the underlying cryptosystem or construction) can be proven secure in the random oracle or ideal cipher model only 1 .
Contribution
In this paper, we propose the first threshold ring signature scheme provable secure without random oracles. It is a threshold extension of the Shacham-Waters (SW) signature [26] . However, we have to note that the extension is not trivial. The typical secret sharing technique cannot be used in the ring signature case. The modified polynomial interpolation technique (e.g. [17, 22, 29] ) requires random oracle to instantiate a signature scheme. Thus, we emphasize that our technique is specially designed for non-random oracle security proof. Additionally, we can still maintain the signature size to be the same as the SW signature, while only a tiny computation cost is added.
PRELIMINARIES

Pairings
We make use of bilinear groups of composite order. Let n be a composite number with factorization n = pq. We have
• G is a multiplicative cyclic groups of order n. 1 Although Han et al. [20] claimed their threshold ring signature scheme is secure in the standard mode, Tsang et al. [29] showed that their proof is incorrect. We do not regard [20] as a provable secure scheme.
• Gp is its cyclic order-p subgroup, and Gq is its cyclic order-q subgroup
• g is a generator of G, while h is a generator of Gq.
• GT is a multiplicative group of order n.
•ê is a bilinear map such that e : G × G → GT with the following properties:
-Bilinearity: For all u, v ∈ G, and a, b ∈ Z,
• GT,p and GT,q are the GT -subgroups of order p and q, respectively.
• The group operations on G and GT can be performed efficiently.
• Bit strings corresponding to elements of G and of GT can be recognized efficiently.
Mathematical Assumptions
For our scheme, we assume two problems are difficult to solve in the setting described above: computational DiffieHellman in Gp and the Subgroup Decision Problem.
Definition 1 (Computational Diffie-Hellman in Gp).
Given the tuple (r, r a , r b ), where r ∈R Gp, and a, b ∈R Zp, compute and output r ab . In the composite setting one is additionally given the description of the larger group G, including the factorization (p, q) of its order n.
Definition 2 (Subgroup Decision).
Given w selected at random either from G (with probability 1/2) or from Gq (with probability 1/2), decide whether w is in Gq. For this problem one is given the description of G, but not given the factorization of n.
The assumptions are formalized by measuring an adversary's success probability for computational Diffie-Hellman and an adversary's guessing advantage for the subgroup decision problem. Note that if CDH in Gp as we have formulated it is hard then so is CDH in G. The assumption that the subgroup decision problem is hard is called Subgroup Hiding (SGH) assumption, and was introduced by Boneh et al [7] .
SECURITY MODEL
We give our security model and define relevant security notions.
Syntax of threshold ring signature
A threshold ring signature, (TRS) scheme, is a tuple of four algorithms (KeyGen, Sign and Verify.
• (ski, pki) ← KeyGen(λ) is a PPT algorithm which, on input a security parameter λ ∈ N, outputs a private/public key pair (ski, pki). We denote by SK and PK the domains of possible secret keys and public keys, resp. When we say that a public key corresponds to a secret key or vice versa, we mean that the secret/public key pair is an output of KeyGen.
• param ← Setup(λ) is a PPT algorithm which, on input a security parameter λ, outputs the set of security parameters param which includes λ.
•
which, on input a group size n, threshold d ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a set Y of n public keys in PK, a set X of d private keys whose corresponding public keys are all contained in Y, and a message M , produces a signature σ.
• accept/reject ← Verify(n, d, Y, M, σ) which, on input a group size n, threshold d ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a set Y of n public keys in PK, a message-signature pair (M ,σ) returns accept or reject. If accept, the message-signature pair is valid.
Correctness.
TRS schemes must satisfy: Verification Correctness. That is, all signatures signed according to specification are accepted during verification.
Notions of Security of threshold ring signature
Security of TRS schemes has two aspects: unforgeability and anonymity. Before giving their definition, we consider the following oracles which together model the ability of the adversaries in breaking the security of the schemes.
• pki ← J O(⊥). The Joining Oracle, on request, adds a new user to the system. It returns the public key pk ∈ PK of the new user.
• ski ← CO(pki). The Corruption Oracle, on input a public key pki ∈ PK that is a query output of J O, returns the corresponding secret key ski ∈ SK.
The Signing Oracle, on input a group size n, a threshold d ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a set Y of n public keys, a signer subset V of Y with |V| = d, and a message M , returns a valid signature σ ′ .
Remark: An alternative approach to specify the SO is to exclude the signer set V from the input and have SO select it according to suitable random distribution. We do not pursue that alternative further.
Unforgeability.
Unforgeability for LTRS schemes is defined in the following game between the Simulator S and the Adversary A in which A is given access to oracles J O, CO and SO:
(a) S generates and gives A the system parameters param.
(b) A may query the oracles according to any adaptive strategy.
(c) A gives S a group size n ∈ N, a threshold d ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a set Y of n public keys in PK, a message M ∈ M and a signature σ ∈ Σ.
A wins the game if:
(1) Verify(·)=accept.
(2) All of the public keys in Y are query outputs of J O. 
We denote by
Adv
.
Definition 4 (Anonymity). A TRS scheme is anonymous if for any PPT adversary A, Adv
Anon A (λ) is negligible.
Summarizing we have:
Definition 5 (Security of TRS Schemes). A TRS scheme is secure if it is unforgeable and anonymous. 4 . OUR PROPOSED THRESHOLD RING SIG-NATURE SCHEME
Construction
We extend the 1-out-of-n SW ring signature scheme [26] into a d-out-of-n threshold setting.
• Setup: The setup algorithm runs the bilinear group generator (N = pq, G, GT ,ê) ← G(1 λ ). Suppose the group generator G also gives the generators g1, B0, u, u1, . . . , u k ∈ G, h1 ∈ Gq and α ∈ ZN . Set g2 = g α 1 and
k be a collision resistant hash function. The public parameters are (N, G, GT ,ê, g1, g2, B0, h1, h2, u, u1, . .
. , u k , H).
Everyone can check the validity of g1, g2, h1, h2 using pairings.
• KeyGen: For user i, he picks a random xi ∈ ZN . His public key is g s i 1 and his secret key is g s i 2 .
• Sign: Define fi such that
1. For i = 1, . . . , n, one of the signer picks xi ∈R ZN and sets
Ci. Then we have
where
xi.
Each signer i computes (m1, . . . , m k ) = H(d, Y, M ). He picks a random ri ∈ ZN and computes
Signer i sends (S1,i, S2,i) to the signer in step 1.
After collecting (S1,i, S2,i) from the t signers, calculate
The signature is (S1, S2, {Ci, πi} n i=1 ).
• Verify:
B0
).
If they are true, compute C = ∏ n i=1 Ci and check if:
Check correctness: 
Security Proof
k . Then B gives the public parameters (N, G, GT ,ê, g1, g2, B0, h1, h2, u, u1, . . . , u k , H) to the adversary A. For a message m = {m1, . . . , m k }, we define
Assume B picks τ as the challenge signer. For i = 1, . . . , n, B picks random si ∈ ZN and sets:
B stores the set of public keys {pki} n i=1 . Oracle Simulation. B simulates the oracles as follows:
• J O: on the i-th query, B returns pki.
• CO(pki): If i = τ , B declares failure and exits. Otherwise, B returns g
, and a set of d signers V, B calculates (Ci, πi) according to the Sign algorithm. Note that no secret key is required to generate (Ci, πi). Then we have
For all pki ∈ V and i ̸ = τ , B calculates all (S1,i, S2,i) according to the Sign algorithm. If pkτ ∈ V,B chooses a random rτ ∈ ZN and calculates
The simulator will be able to perform this computation if and only if F (m) ̸ = 0 mod N . For ease of analysis the simulator will only continue in the sufficient condition where Finally, B calculates the rest of the signature according to the Sign algorithm. 
Otherwise, WLOG, we assume that pkτ is at the position τ of the signature σ * . Since σ * is a valid signature, then
for i = 1, . . . , n * . Sinceê(h1, π * i ) has order q in GT , therefore either C * i or 
For equation 3, note that
From equation 4, we can see that
Therefore B can output
as the solution to the CDH problem.
Analysis. Following the probability analysis of Waters signature, the probability of F (m) ̸ = 0 mod N during signing oracle query and Proof. Setup. The simulator B is given the subgroup decision problem instance (N, G, GT ,ê, g, h) . B is asked to determine whether h ∈ G or h ∈ Gq. B randomly picks the generators u, u1, . . . u k , B0 ∈ G and α ∈ ZN . B sets
Finally, B randomly chooses a collision resistant hash func-
Then B gives the public parameters (N, G, GT ,ê, g1, g2, B0, h1, h2, u, u1, . . . , u k , H) to the adversary A.
For i = 1, . . . , n, B picks random si ∈ ZN and sets:
B stores the set of public keys and secret keys {pki, ski} n i=1 . Oracle Simulation. B simulates the oracles as follows:
• Analysis. Suppose the challenge signature is (S *
)h
has no information about the real signer if h ∈ G.
On the other hand, S * 2 is computed by random numbers only and do not have information about the real signer. Finally, S * 1 is determined by the verification equation
Hence, it leaks no useful information about the set V * . Therefore if A wins the game, B outputs h ∈ Gq.
Insider Security for Anonymity
From the above security proof of anonymity, we can see that the adversary cannot win the game even if it is given all user secret keys (which is known as the full key exposure attack [5] ). According to the security model, the challenge signature σ * is solely generated by the simulator and the adversary does not obtain any internal information during the generation of σ * . However, our security model does not consider the insider security during the generation of threshold ring signatures. The adversary may use the information transferred between different signers to break the anonymity. In our construction, S1,i and S2,i are sent from user i to a central signer who runs step 1 and step 3 of the Sign algorithm. If any S1,i and S2,i is eavesdropped, or the (malicious) central signer releases the S1,i and S2,i, then the anonymity of user i is lost. Therefore, our current security model for anonymity assumes that the communication channel between signers are secure, and all signers are trusted during the generation of the threshold ring signatures. However, our anonymity model still captures the case that a signer loses his secret key to the adversary before or after the generation of σ * . We just do not allow the adversary to actively participate in the generation of the threshold ring signature.
Efficiency Analysis
When comparing our scheme with the 1-out-of-n SW ring signature scheme, the size of our signature is exactly the same as the SW scheme. In terms of computation cost, the overall signing process only increases by some elliptic curve addition operations. However, if it is measured as per signer computation, each signer actually requires less, when compared to the SW scheme. The verification algorithm only requires 1 more exponentiation to the SW scheme.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented an efficient construction of threshold ring signature without random oracles. Our scheme is a non-trivial extension of the Shacham-Waters (SW) signature [26] . Interestingly, we obtained the same signature size as the Shacham-Waters signature, while only a tiny computation cost is added. We note that our technique has been specifically customized to achieve a threshold ring signature in the standard model.
